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ABSTRACT13
TheYarmoukRiver basin is shared between Syria, Jordan, and Israel. Since the 1960s, Yarmouk14
River flows have declined more than 85% despite the signature of bilateral agreements. Syria and15
Jordan blame each other for the decline and have both developed their own explanatory narratives:16
Jordan considers that Syria violated their 1987 agreement by building more dams than what was17
agreed on, while Syria blames climate change. In fact, as the two countries do not share information,18
neither on hydrological flows nor on water management, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish19
between natural and anthropogenic factors affecting the flow regime. Remote sensing and multi-20
agent simulation are combined to carry out an independent, quantitative, analysis of Jordanian21
and Syrian competing narratives and show that a third cause for which there is no provision in22
the bilateral agreements actually explains much of the changes in the flow regime: groundwater23
over-abstraction by Syrian highland farmers.24
1 Avisse, April 6, 2020
INTRODUCTION25
The Yarmouk River basin (YRB) is shared by three countries: Syria, Jordan, and Israel (Fig. 1).26
Since the 1960s, development in the basin has increased and the historical annual flow of 450-27
500 hm3/year (million cubic meter per year; Burdon 1954; Salameh and Bannayan 1993; Hof28
1998; UN-ESCWA and BGR 2013) has dropped by more than 85% to reach 60 hm3/year in 201029
indicating river basin closure. In 2013, river discharges rose to 120 hm3/year during the Syrian30
civil war (Fig. 2).31
The collapse of the Yarmouk flow occurred despite the signature of two bilateral agreements.32
The first one was signed in 1953 between Syria and Jordan (1953) and updated in 1987 (Syria33
and Jordan 1987) essentially to recognize water uses and dams already built in Syria (Rosenberg34
2006; Hussein 2017). The 1987 version gives the right to Syria to retain water in 28 dams on the35
Yarmouk basin for a cumulative capacity of 164.64 hm3, and allows Jordan to use water in the36
Wahda reservoir (a major reservoir that had yet to be built on the Yarmouk River; see Fig. 1) to37
irrigate crops in the Jordan Valley along the King Abdullah Canal (KAC) and to supply Amman38
with freshwater. No explicit limitation regarding groundwater withdrawals is mentioned in the39
document. The second agreement is the Treaty of Peace signed between Israel and Jordan (1994),40
which gives the two countries specific water rights on the Yarmouk waters: (8) Israel is entitled to41
a 25 hm3 annual allocation while Jordan gets the rest of the flow; and (88) Jordan has the possibility42
to store up to 20 hm3 each year in Lake Tiberias during the Winter Period, and get it back at43
the entrance of the KAC in the Summer Period (concession). Technically, the sharing of water is44
operated at Adasiya (outlet of the YRB; see Fig. 1).45
After considering surface water flow depletion caused by the Syrian reservoirs listed in the46
1987 agreement, reduced groundwater triggered by irrigation from springs and projected wells in47
Syria, and irrigation return flows, the Jordanian Ministry of Water and Irrigation/Jordan Valley48
Authority (MWI/JVA 2002) expected inflows to the Wahda dam to attain 117.6 hm3/year. Yet, the49
flow monitored by MWI/JVA has never reached such a level before the Syrian civil war, and Jordan50
has been the first affected by the river decline due to (8) its downstream position as most springs and51
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wadis (intermittent rivers) feeding the Yarmouk are located in Syria and the Israel-controlled Golan52
Heights, and (88) the fact that it bears the brunt of the hydrological risk as per the Israel–Jordan53
Treaty (no matter the flow reachingWahda, Jordan has to send the 25 hm3/year allocation to Israel).54
The in situ measurements of the Yarmouk River flow by MWI/JVA at the Wahda dam, or55
Maqarin station before the dam’s construction, and Adasiya are actually the only publicly available56
ground data in the basin. Even before the civil war, the Syrian regime never published water57
resources data or shared it with neighboring basin states. It is unknown what data the Syrian58
government collected or its quality. The data available are aggregated country- or basin-wide59
estimates from international donor organizations like the FAO or World Bank (Salman and Mualla60
2008). For years following the 1960s, three stages can be observed in the WAJ/JVA data (Fig. 2):61
(8) a stationary regime before 1999; (88) a sharp decrease of both the base flow and the runoff during62
the period 1999-2012; and (888) the return of the runoff from 2013, when many Syrian refugees fled63
the civil war (Müller et al. 2016).64
Jordan and Syria have both developed their own, competing, narratives to explain the decrease65
in Yarmouk flows: downstream Jordan considers that Syria violated their 1987 bilateral agreement66
by building more dams than what was agreed on, while upstream Syria blames climate change and67
particularly precipitation decrease (Hussein 2017). Each perspective is fostered by a few studies.68
Regarding the Syrian narrative, Salameh and Bannayan (1993) estimate that rainfall dropped by69
30% in the second half of the 20th century. Moreover, after comparing two periods, 1927-195470
versus 1968-1987, Beaumont (1997) comes to the conclusion that natural runoffs were, on average,71
25% lower in the second period. The fact that three of the four most severe multi-year droughts72
in the region since 1901 occurred after 1990 is also attributed to climate change according to73
Kelley et al. (2015). Other analyses overlook such natural aspects and rather adopt the Jordanian74
narrative that Yarmouk flows declined because of excessive water abstractions and uncoordinated75
construction of dams in the Syrian part of the YRB (FAO 2009; Yorke 2016).76
Actually, Syria’s role in the closure of the Yarmouk River basin is controversial, but not77
the significant extension of irrigated agriculture in that part of the basin (Shentsis et al. 2019).78
3 Avisse, April 6, 2020
Before the 1960s, the Yarmouk and upstream wadis waters were primarily exploited for subsistence79
agriculture (Courcier et al. 2005), but it changed with the first agrarian reform in 1958 and the80
following agricultural policies (Ababsa 2013; Ibrahim et al. 2014), which were implemented at the81
expense of water resources sustainability (Barnes 2009). In 1997, irrigation accounted for more82
than 80% of water use in the Syrian part of the YRB (World Bank 2001). Aw-Hassan et al. (2014)83
distinguish three phases in the development of irrigation in Syria. In the first one, between 196684
and 1984, irrigation systems expanded. The country started building numerous dams and canals85
on the Yarmouk tributaries in the upper part of the YRB to increase surface water availability.86
However, these investments were not sufficient to enable the agricultural production to meet the87
ever-growing population needs. In the middle of the 1980s, Syria still had to import a large share88
of basic food supplies (Ababsa 2013). In the second phase (1985-2000), irrigated crops area kept89
expanding with the Government’s objective to increase food security and ensure self-sufficiency90
(Salman and Mualla 2008). Groundwater-irrigated area particularly grew – nationwide, its share91
rose from 49% in 1985 to 58% in 2000 (Kaisi and Yasser 2004) – as farmers could get low interest92
loans, well licenses were more easily delivered and fuel was strongly subsidized (Gül et al. 2005).93
But some of these incentives also fostered the growth of illegal groundwater pumping: 50% of wells94
were unlicensed at the end of the century (World Bank 2001; Salman and Mualla 2008). The third95
and last phase defined by Aw-Hassan et al. (2014), from 2001 to 2010, can then be described as a96
challenging management period for Syria. The Government tried to address groundwater depletion97
while liberalizing the economy to stimulate investments in the agricultural sector (Ababsa 2010;98
Kelley et al. 2015) and ensure food security. As a result, the decrease in the water table level could99
only be slowed down. To these development stages followed the civil war in March 2011. This100
conflict and the 2013 Syrian refugees migration led to destruction of reservoirs and reduction in101
reservoir storage in the Syrian part of the YRB (Müller et al. 2016). The impact on irrigation land102
area and operational wells remains uncertain (Etana Syria 2015).103
Work to clarify the causes of the flow decrease has become nearly impossible since the start of104
the civil war in Syria. To the best of our knowledge, the study conducted by Al-Bakri et al. (2016)105
4 Avisse, April 6, 2020
on the Jordanian part of the YRB is the only analysis that provides local information on land use106
and water withdrawals. However, detailed information on reservoir operation, canal diversions,107
irrigation requirements, and groundwater withdrawals – all within Syria – is lacking and crucial108
to identify with precision the causes to flow regime changes, and to distinguish consistent study109
results from politically biased narratives.110
Associating remote sensing with river basin modeling has been largely used to deal with111
remote, ungauged or conflict-torn areas. For example, Pereira-Cardenal et al. (2011) process112
remote sensing data in real-time and use them as input to a simulation-based hydro-economic113
model of the Syr Darya River basin. Rougé et al. (2018) present a modeling framework that114
relies on both land data assimilation and river basin modeling to identify key water resources115
vulnerabilities in transboundary river basins where data on both hydrological fluxes and on the116
management of reservoirs are either absent or incomplete. In that work, however, the authors117
ignore the institutional complexity by assuming that water allocation decisions are taken by a118
single organization (or agent) overlooking the entire river basin. In developed river basins, the119
impacts of hydrological and anthropogenic changes are often intertwined. Assessing their relative120
contribution is often a prerequisite towards the development of effective policies. For instance, Lei121
et al. (2019) use a coupled agent-hydrologic model to compare various water management policies122
based on environmental and economic criteria in the Heihe River basin in China. Biglarbeigi123
et al. (2018) analyze climate change uncertainty in the Dez and Karoun River basins in Iran to124
identify the dominant natural factors to focus on in the future when designing new infrastructure125
and monitoring systems.126
We combine remote sensing and multi-agent simulation (MAS) to validate and apply the127
modeling approach in a river basin (the Yarmouk) where one country (Syria) is experiencing a128
civil war and limited ground data is available for use. We further use the validated model to test129
competing hypotheses and country narratives about the causes of a 60-year decline in stream flows,130
as well as possible future trajectories for flows after the civil war winds down and the roles riparian131
countries can play in post-war recovery efforts. Our working hypothesis is that the outflows of this132
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highly-developed river basin are the synthesis of policies developed more or less independently by133
several institutions in the riparian countries.134
This paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the river basin MAS modeling135
framework based on remote sensing and its application to the Yarmouk River basin. The remaining136
sections discuss the simulation results, present a sensitivity analysis, and provide concluding137
remarks.138
MATERIALS AND METHODS139
To analyze the two contested claims regarding the collapse ofYRBoutflows, we need amodeling140
framework that can (8) retrieve both hydrological and anthropogenic data and (88) handle multi-scale141
interactions among diverse institutions, both with limited on-the-ground data. This is achieved by142
combining remote sensing with multi-agent simulation.143
Remote Sensing144
Remote sensing is used to retrieve hydrological and anthropogenic data for the river basin MAS145
model without any detailed on-the-ground measurement, observation, survey or interaction with146
water resources managers.147
Physical network148
We use the method developed by Avisse et al. (2017) to locate reservoirs, assess their maximal149
storage capacities, and monitor their storage levels from Landsat satellite images and digital eleva-150
tion models (DEMs) only. The basic idea behind the method is to statistically correct the vertical151
errors of the DEM using the information on water surface areas derived from Landsat images:152
pixels more frequently immersed are likely to be lower than their neighbors which are less often153
covered with water. After this correction, the storage–area relationship can be determined and154
combined with Landsat images available at regular time intervals to obtain the storage trajectory of155
the reservoir without any direct measurements (storage variations are used in the section Validation156
for confirming our hypothesis on reservoirs operation policy). We then detect 37 reservoirs in the157
YRB (Fig. 1): 25 are Syrian and listed in the agreement between Syria and Jordan (1987), 1 is158
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listed in the agreement but under Israeli control in the Golan Heights, 1 is the Wahda dam, and the159
remaining 10 have been unilaterally built by the three countries in the basin. These last 10 dams160
have a cumulative storage capacity of 34.5 hm3 in Syria, less than 0.1 hm3 in Jordan, and 2.9 hm3161
in the Israel-occupied Golan Heights (Fig. 3). Many detected reservoirs are very small as they are162
found to have not stored more than 1 hm3 in 30 years. 2 dams among the 28 listed in the agreement163
are not detected because they are too small or rarely filled with water.164
We choose to model 20 reservoirs with capacity greater than 1 hm3 and naturalized incremental165
runoffs greater than 0.3 hm3/year that we expect will most affect Yarmouk River flow (Table 1).166
At the YRB outlet, the exchange system at Adasiya (see Fig. 3) separates the flow between167
alpha (diversion to the KAC) and beta (natural route), and the Israeli system at the Yarmoukeem168
Pool (YP; 3.5 km downstream from Adasiya along beta) sends up to 4.5 m3/s to Lake Tiberias,169
essentially to supply the allocation and concession. This concession is eventually sent back to the170
KAC from Lake Tiberias as per the treaty between Israel and Jordan (1994). Flows above 4.5 m3/s171
go to the Jordan River.172
Rivers, pipes and canals connecting reservoirs and irrigated crop areas are obtained using173
DigitalGlobe and CNES/Airbus high resolution (∼1 m) imagery available via Google Earth and174
elevation from a DEM (Protocol S3). Extrapolations from ground measurements in Jordan are also175
made to estimate evaporation – which is a major water loss according to MWI/JVA (2002) – and176
sedimentation (Protocols S4 and S5).177
Irrigation water demands are derived from remotely sensed land use maps and precipitation,178
crop water requirements (Allen et al. 1998), and standard irrigation efficiencies (Protocol S6).179
Hydrological modeling180
In this study, the lumpmodel GR2Mdeveloped byMouelhi et al. (2006) is chosen, because of its181
simple formulation, to derive river basin outflows that will supply our distributed river basin model.182
This rainfall–runoff hydrological model relies on two parameters (the capacity of a soil moisture183
reservoir and an underground water exchange parameter; see the calibration in Protocol S1). The184
model also requires two input variables only – precipitation and evapotranspiration (ETP) – to185
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produce a discharge on a monthly time step. The resulting outflows from GR2M are separated186
between base flow (moving minimum over a 12 months period) and runoff (remaining flow). The187
latter is then spatially disaggregated at the location of each reservoir using precipitation and drainage188
area ratios to produce the incremental inflows (Protocol S1). Average values of these incremental189
inflows over the historical period are given in Table 1 for information. The base flow corresponds190
to the groundwater flow reaching the outlet of the basin, and depends on groundwater withdrawals,191
irrigation return flows, and infiltration inside rivers (Protocol S2).192
The monthly PERSIANN-CDR (Precipitation Estimation from Remotely Sensed Information193
using Artificial Neural Networks-Climate Data Record) product is used for our modeling. This194
dataset covers the latitude band 60◦S-60◦N with a 0.25◦ spatial resolution from 1983 onwards. It is195
generated from the PERSIANNalgorithm that predicts rainfall using geostationary satelliteGridSat-196
B1 infrared data, and relies on 2.5◦-resolution gridded precipitation from Global Precipitation197
Climatology Project (GPCP) gauges for monthly bias correction (Ashouri et al. 2015). We measure198
an average PERSIANN-CDR precipitation for 1983-2015 over the YRB of 239 mm/year (Fig. 2) –199
i.e. 64% of the 372 mm/year estimated by Salameh and Bannayan (1993) for the pre-development200
stage. The decline is consistent with the 30% rainfall drop for the second half of the 20th century201
compared to the pre-development period considered by the same authors. Locally, to address the202
coarse spatial resolution of PERSIANN-CDR data compared to the size of the YRB, its reservoirs203
watersheds or crop areas, the precipitation data are corrected based on isohyets found in general204
hydrological studies of the YRB (Burdon 1954; Barnes 2009; Salameh and Bannayan 1993) for205
further use as input data for the hydrological modeling and for the assessment of crop water206
requirements (Protocol S1).207
The seasonal distribution of PERSIANN-CDR rainfall in the YRB is verified afterward in the208
section Validation.209
Multi-Agent Simulation210
Because the whole system depicted in Fig. 3 is managed by multiple riparian countries, gov-211
ernment agencies, water users and infrastructure operators, we need a modeling framework that212
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enables multi-scale interactions between all those agents. Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2009) de-213
fine multi-agent systems as “systems including agents that have diverging information, or different214
information or both, and performing in the same environment”. Unlike optimization problems,215
there is no global supervising structure. Agents are autonomous entities that interact with others216
and take their own decisions. Levels of interactions between agents thus characterize levels of217
cooperation. In water resources system applications, agents correspond to decision-makers hav-218
ing access to some information from different parts of the system (i.e. MAS environment), and219
pursuing different and often competing objectives. Decision making processes are implemented220
from hypotheses based on the kind of political regime and organization inside the countries, and221
on international relations for transboundary study cases. Such hypotheses are made following the222
analyst’s interpretation of all contracts or agreements available, either implicit statu quo processes223
or explicit policy documents.224
A MAS model is then developed using the Pynsim architecture (Knox et al. 2018). It relies on225
a network made of nodes and arcs, which is particularly useful to represent spatially distributed226
agents inside the same river basin system (Harou et al. 2009). Nodes symbolize reservoirs, aquifers,227
consumption sites, and diversion systems; and arcs symbolize rivers, pipes, canals, and groundwater228
transfers. The main asset of Pynsim, though, lies in the capacity to define different institutional229
levels of managing agents, from individual actors whomanage one site to institutions who supervise230
interactions within the water resources system (Knox et al. 2018). These agents are integrated in231
a single computing framework where human and institutional decisions complement the physical232
processes from a traditional arcs and nodes representation.233
In the MAS model of the YRB, the agents represent their real-world counterparts ranging from234
government agencies towater users. The hierarchical organization of the agents is depicted on Fig. 4.235
At the highest level, we find the riparian countries who typically interact within the framework236
of bilateral treaties (if any). At the intermediate level, the operators of the main reservoirs and237
diversions allocate water in space and time based on the intersectoral allocation policies dictated by238
their government. In Jordan, this top-down approach reflects the institutional regime and decision-239
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making in the water sector where the Ministry of Water and Irrigation oversees water resources240
management and planning. In Syria, such a top-down policy making approach is consistent with an241
authoritarian regime. Regarding Israel, we made the assumption that the development of land and242
water resources in the occupied Golan Heights would need the approval of the government. At the243
lowest level, the extent of water use by farmers and municipalities is influenced mostly by policies244
regarding land use and groundwater extraction. Further downstream, at Adasiya-YP (Fig. 3), water245
exchanges with Lake Tiberias are taking place. These water transfers follow the terms of the Peace246
Treaty between Jordan and Israel.247
The political and physical interactions between Israel and Jordan are also represented in Fig. 4248
where we can see the Treaty of Peace and the corresponding water exchanges between Adasiya and249
Lake Tiberias. There is no connection between Syrian and Jordanian institutions because there is250
no effective cooperation between the two countries, despite the signature of the 1987 agreement251
(Hussein 2017).252
At the level of reservoir operators, we assume that those operators follow the standard operating253
policy (SOP; Protocol S7): local water demands are met first and excess water is stored and254
eventually spilled when the reservoir reaches its maximum storage capacity (Etana Syria 2015).255
Note that this assumption is further discussed in the section Validation. As for the Wahda dam256
operator, this agent releases water from the reservoir only when the inflows make the simulated257
storage larger than the storage that has been measured on the ground by JVA (Validation step), or258
more water in case the outflow is not sufficient to satisfy the allocation (scenario analysis step; see259
the section Consequences on the water transfers as per the 1994 Treaty of Peace). Other agents are260
defined to characterize Jordanian and Israeli controllers of the diversion systems at Adasiya and the261
Yarmoukeem Pool.262
Water users are linked to water sources based on the land use maps and detailed imagery263
available in Google Earth. For irrigated crop areas close to dams listed in Table 1 and built for264
irrigation purpose, farmers are assumed to withdraw water from reservoirs first to try to meet the265
demand and then from aquifers if there is not enough water in the reservoirs (Etana Syria 2015).266
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For the other irrigated crop areas, water is directly withdrawn from aquifers. Households from267
large cities near dams are also considered as they are assumed to use the reservoirs as their primary268
source of water and to contribute to the decrease of their storage. Other water usages have been269
ignored (see Protocol S6).270
The validation of agent-based models can be challenging due to limited social data and the large271
number of interactions between the agents and their environment (Heath et al. 2009; Ligtenberg272
et al. 2010; Filatova et al. 2013; Bert et al. 2014). However, in our MAS, the agents’ behavior is273
essentially reactive (not proactive), meaning that the number of interactions is much more limited.274
The validation approach adopted in this study is the same as traditional modeling efforts where275
we compare the simulated river discharges at Wahda dam and Adasiya to historical observations.276
Individual decision-making processes have been calibrated with on-the-ground observations, using277
remote sensing analyses or based on signed agreements (see the equations in Protocols S6 and S7).278
Scenarios over the Historical Period279
Different scenarios representing alternative theories (either narratives from the riparian coun-280
tries or complementary ideas that have yet to be fully explored) regarding the hydrological changes281
in the YRB are simulated with the Pynsim MAS model. Such scenarios are implemented by282
modifying input data (precipitation, infrastructure or land use) for the modeling.283
The five scenarios are:284
1. No precipitation decline. A higher precipitation is considered to produce the 422 hm3/year285
natural flow at Adasiya that was expected by Jordan in the feasibility study of the Wahda286
dam (MWI/JVA 2002). This scenario models the Syrian narrative.287
2. Listed dams only. Only dams listed in the Syria–Jordan agreement (i.e. all dams except288
Qunaitera and Avnei Eitan al-Golan; Table 1) are modeled. This scenario simulates the289
Jordanian narrative.290
3. No groundwater pumping development. Crop water requirements in areas located far291
from reservoirs remain unchanged after the signature of the agreement between Syria and292
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Jordan in 1987. This scenario shows the effects of assumptions in the 1953 and 1987293
agreements that ignore groundwater pumping.294
4. All dams active 2013-present. All dams continue to operate in 2011 as in prior years. This295
scenario assumes conditions continue as though the Syrian civil war did not occur.296
5. Aggregate effects. Combination of the four prior scenarios with increased precipitation,297
only dams listed in the Syrian-Jordanian agreement, no groundwater pumping development,298
and continued operation of the dams after 2011.299
It must be stressed that, due to the uncertainty on all the remote sensed data used in this study,300
the sensitivity of the model is tested in the section Sensitivity analysis further below with regard301
to three independent hydrological parameters: (8) the estimated natural flow, (88) infiltration and302
irrigation return flows to the aquifer, and (888) crop water requirements.303
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION304
Remote Sensing Observations305
The evolution of cumulative storage capacity and cumulative water stored in reservoirs of the306
YRB (except Wahda; see Protocol S3) is presented in Fig. 5. These results enable us to do a first307
qualitative analysis of the impact of the construction of dams on the discharge observed downstream308
(Fig. 2). We note that the pre-1995 growth of the cumulative storage capacity does not seem to have309
affected the hydrological regime of the river during the same period of time. However, without310
precipitation data for years between the pre-development phase (pre-1960s) and 1983, it is difficult311
to consistently conclude on the impact of the new dams. Indeed, as mentioned in the Introduction,312
rainfall seems to have strongly varied during this period of time. On the contrary, while the313
cumulative storage capacity remained the same between 1999 and 2006, the runoff declined and314
the filling of the reservoirs was affected. The reasons behind these changes should then be found315
in the late 1990s multi-year drought (Kelley et al. 2015) and/or in increasing water withdrawals316
for irrigation purpose (Aw-Hassan et al. 2014). The consecutive low Yarmouk River flow and low317
reservoir water storage coincidewith the 2007-2008 drought. Higher precipitation in the subsequent318
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years (period 2009-2012), though, did not materialize in higher discharges downstream, as more319
water has been stored in the reservoirs. Finally, it seems clear that the disuse of many reservoirs320
in 2013, after the Syrian civil war started, led to less water stored in the YRB and to larger runoff321
discharges during the following years.322
Next, the model is validated with historical measurements and afterwards the scenarios defined323
in section Scenarios over theHistorical Period are tested to quantitatively complement the qualitative324
results.325
Validation326
The Pynsim MAS simulation model is run to recreate the observed flow at the Wahda dam and327
Adasiya over the historical period (Fig. 6).328
Qualitatively, the model reproduces well the seasonality of the Yarmouk River flow. The fact329
that we can capture well the intensity of peak flow events over a 30-year period is an indication330
that the contribution of PERSIANN-CDR precipitation to runoff (and thus to baseflow) is properly331
captured. The model also replicates well the three periods initially identified at the Wahda dam332
station (Fig. 2): (8) the stationary period before 1999, (88) the subsequent collapse of both the base333
flow and the runoff, and (888) the return of runoff in 2013. The fact that the simulated base flow334
collapses in 1999, at the exact same time as in the observations, also validates the reasoning behind335
the definition of a threshold on groundwater abstractions (see Protocol S2). The slight difference336
in the rate of the base flow reduction may be explained either by errors on irrigation requirements337
(or a change in irrigation efficiency) or by the simplistic representation of the aquifer’s dynamics338
in the modeling. The contrasted quality of the results for certain years (e.g., 1990, 2004, 2014 at339
Wahda; or 1993 at Adasiya) may be caused by errors in PERSIANN-CDR data, by the difficulty to340
locally calibrate this precipitation dataset (or the GR2M model; see the section Sensitivity analysis341
on that matter below) or by a few temporary changes in the operation of the Syrian reservoirs.342
As indicated in the section Multi-Agent Simulation, we made the assumption that the reservoirs343
were operated using the standard operating policy (SOP). To test the validity of this assumption,344
we compare simulated storages in Syria and in the occupied Golan Heights to remote sensing345
13 Avisse, April 6, 2020
observations (see Protocol S3). With a correlation coefficient of 0.66, we conclude that SOP346
captures relatively well the operation of the main reservoirs over the 1998-2015 period. Differences347
between model estimates and remote-sensed values are potentially influenced by errors on the348
assessment of natural inflows, land use, irrigation requirements, crop–water source association,349
reservoir operation or just remote-sensed storage estimates.350
As for the results at the outlet of the YRB, we calculate the 80B (Eq. 1 and the modified351
Kling-Gupta efficiency-statistic ( ′ in Eq. 2; Gupta et al. 2009; Kling et al. 2012) to measure352
the quality of the simulated flows:353
80B = `B − `> (1)
354
 ′ = 1 −
√
(A − 1)2 + (V − 1)2 + (W − 1)2 (2)
where A is the correlation coefficient between simulated and observed flows, V = `B/`> is the bias355
ratio with ` the mean discharge, W = +B/+> = (fB/`B)/(f>/`>) is the variability ratio with +356
the coefficient of variation and f the standard deviation, and B and > indices stand for simulated357
and observed data respectively. The  ′ is chosen over the Nash-Sutcliffe efficiency because it358
better captures the variability of flows in the Yarmouk River.359
We then obtain 80B values of -2.46 hm3/month and -0.02 hm3/month, and  ′ values of360
0.64 and 0.90 for discharges at Adasiya and the Wahda dam respectively. The contrasted results for361
the 80B come from the large differences between simulated and observed flows during particular362
years as mentioned above (e.g., 80B of -92.51 hm3/month and -86.26 hm3/month at Adasiya for363
February and March 2003). However, the  ′ values reveal that the MAS model is able to364
reproduce fairly accurately the historical flows at Wahda (upstream) and to a less extent at Adasiya.365
The lower performance at Adasiya is mainly due to the fact that the river discharges at that location366
are strongly influenced by the releases from the Wahda dam.367
14 Avisse, April 6, 2020
Scenario Analysis368
Causes of the Yarmouk River flow changes369
In this section, we analyze the results of the scenarios presented in the section Scenarios over370
the Historical Period. The analysis focuses on the inflow into the Wahda reservoir because (8) most371
dams and irrigated crops in the YRB are located upstream from that reservoir (Fig. 3), and (88) the372
flow at Adasiya is strongly influenced by the operation of that reservoir.373
We observe that the base flow still sharply decreases in 1999 with the no precipitation decline374
and listed dams only scenarios (Fig. 7, top). It means that neither the reduced precipitation nor the375
unlisted dams caused that major hydrological change. On the contrary, the stationary base flow376
after 1999 under the no groundwater development scenario confirms that increased groundwater377
abstractions strongly impacted the base flow (as explained in the Introduction). If groundwater378
pumping had not developed since 1987, the groundwater table would have remained at the same379
level and the base flow would not have been affected.380
The difference between the annual flow for each scenario and the simulated historical flow381
is presented in Fig. 7 (bottom). This figure shows the impact of each scenario on the Yarmouk382
discharge. Until 1999, our simulations show that anthropogenic activity had little or no effect383
on the Yarmouk River flows. The main difference between the historical and aggregate effects384
flows lies in the precipitation decline that mostly has effects during the runoff (winter) season.385
From 2000 onwards, however, the impact of large groundwater withdrawals is particularly clear386
as the gap between the simulated historical and no groundwater development scenarios keeps387
increasing until the base flow completely disappears in 2006. In 2013, our modeling shows that the388
destruction/disuse of Syrian dams led to an increase of the runoff by 25.7 hm3/year (i.e. +87%) on389
average over the period 2013-2015. This value is consistent with the ∼25 hm3/year estimate from390
Müller et al. (2016). It must be stressed that this sudden increase did not alleviate water scarcity in391
Jordan though, as more than 500,000 Syrian refugees entered the country during the same period392
of time (UNHCR 2017). The simulation of the listed dams only scenario finally reveals that the393
impact of the unilateral construction and operation of dams by Syria and Israel is marginal over the394
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whole 1983-2015 historical period.395
Moreover, provided that groundwater abstractions had remained at the 1987 level, Jordan396
would likely have received a discharge close to the 117.6 hm3/year that it expected to fill the Wahda397
reservoir. Indeed, with the simulation of the no groundwater pumping development scenario,398
the modeled flow reaching Wahda during the period 2006-2012 remains close to 100 hm3/year399
higher than the ∼15 hm3/year measured by MWI/JVA during this period (Fig. 2). In other words,400
groundwater extraction – rather than precipitation decline or dam construction – is the cause of the401
decline in Yarmouk flow at Wahda dam.402
Sensitivity analysis403
To assess the robustness of the conclusions regarding the collapse of Yarmouk River flows, a404
sensitivity analysis is carried out for three independent hydrological parameters:405
1. The natural inflows to each reservoir. Because the estimate of the Yarmouk River his-406
torical discharge varies significantly from one reference to another, scenarios are simulated407
with the most extreme values found in the literature: 400 and 500 hm3/year (Libiszewski408
1995).409
2. Wadi and irrigation return flows to the aquifer. Infiltration is one of the main factors410
affecting base flow. This parameter is usually estimated using rules of thumb based on411
the case study’s soil properties, and can vary in the ratio of one to two (Mohan and412
Vijayalakshmi 2009). Here, we assess the impact of a change by ±10% (average error413
considered by Dewandel et al. 2007).414
3. Crop water requirements (CWR) estimated with the FAO Penman-Monteith method.415
After conducting ground measurements, Al-Bakri et al. (2016) and Bastiaanssen (2015)416
decreased some of FAO’s crop coefficients by ∼15% to estimate irrigation water use in417
Jordan (Protocol S6). The sensitivity of the model to CWR estimates is then assessed by418
running the scenarios with CWR modified by ±15% in all countries.419
We simulate the four prior scenarios (historical, no precipitation decline, listed dams only, no420
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groundwater pumping development) using each of the three values (lower, standard, larger) for each421
parameter (natural flow, infiltration percentage, crop water requirements estimate). The results of422
the 4× 3× 3× 3 = 108 simulations are shown on Fig. 8 in terms of (8) average yearly flows and (88)423
25th percentile of monthly flows between the start of the collapse of the Yarmouk River flow and424
the beginning of the civil war (period 2000-2010). We consider in the following that the average425
yearly flow serves as an indicator for both base flow and runoff, and that the 25th percentile of426
monthly flows indicates base flow differences between the various simulations.427
The examination of Fig. 8 reveals that the model is more sensitive to a change in both infiltration428
and crop water requirements than to the historical annual flow: natural flow simulations can thus be429
visually aggregated to analyze the nine combinations of CWR and infiltration. Three main patterns430
can be observed:431
1. Reduced groundwater pumping has the largest effect on average yearly streamflows and432
25th percentile of monthly flows (base flow) in seven of the nine combinations of CWR433
and infiltration: {-15%, -10%}, {-15%, -}, {-, -10%}, {-, -}, {-, +10%}, {+15%, -},434
{+15%, +10%}. For the 10% higher infiltration rate and 15% CWR reduction rate, no435
groundwater pumping development still has a strong influence on 25th percentile flow and436
the no precipitation decline has an equal or slightly larger effect. These results reinforce437
the base case results.438
2. In three combinations ({-15%, -}, {-15%, +10%}, {-, +10%}), the base flow remains at a439
certain level above 1 hm3/month and total yearly flows above 75 hm3/year with any scenario,440
including the historical one. These situations are then not realistic because base flow and441
total Yarmouk flows are supposed to decline in the historical scenario representing the442
historical Yarmouk River flow monitored by MWI/JVA. For the other combinations, the443
existence of a base flow each time requires the reduction of groundwater pumping, although444
the effect is quite limited for the 10% infiltration reduction and 15% CWR increase. This445
last finding also corroborates the fact that the increase in groundwater abstraction is the446
main cause to the decline of base flows.447
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3. In one combination {+15%, -10%}, the recharge of the aquifer is extremely limited and the448
base flow collapses nomatter the scenario. In this case, it seems that the surface water would449
not have been sufficient to meet the agricultural demand. Farmers close to the reservoirs450
would then have pumped more water from the aquifer, while, at the same time, the aquifer451
would have less recharged due to the decreased infiltration. In this situation, the Yarmouk452
River flow would have decreased with any of our scenarios, and the main cause of the flow453
decline would probably have been the general growth of agricultural demand close to the454
Syrian reservoirs.455
It must be stressed that this sensitivity analysis is largely specific to our case study. As the water456
sources, usages and management policies may be different in other basins, we suggest that a similar457
sensitivity analysis be conducted for other applications of the method to corroborate any findings458
when no on-the-ground information is available.459
Consequences on the water transfers as per the 1994 Treaty of Peace460
The analysis of this section is conducted over the post-treaty period (1994-2015). All scenarios461
defined in the previous section are considered but the all dams active one since it only affects the462
Yarmouk flows after 2013. Israel and Jordan both receive the largest percentage increases in water463
under the no groundwater pumping scenario (Table 2). The scenario in which Syria would have464
solely built the dams listed in the 1987 Syria–Jordan agreement is the only one that leads to very465
small increases in flow. For all scenarios, Israel’s relative percentage increase is larger than for466
Jordan and this result confirms that Jordan bears larger hydrological risk under the Jordan–Israel467
Treaty of Peace.468
Future Scenarios469
We examine three future scenarios for the years 2016-2025 with the aim to identify (8) potential470
water flows of the Yarmouk as the Syrian civil war winds down, and (88) how Jordan can support the471
post-war recovery to simultaneously assist Syrians and promote Jordan’s own hydrological interests.472
Each scenario assumes precipitation is the same as for 2006-2015 (236 mm/year on average, similar473
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to the historical 239 mm/year average). We recognize that future conditions (social, hydrological,474
and other) are highly uncertain in conflict areas such as the Yarmouk basin in Syria, and the475
precision of results critically depends on scenario assumptions. The principal value of these future476
scenarios is to compare results across conditions that may manifest in the post-war period and help477
basin states see what role, if any, they could play in recovery efforts:478
1. Status quo. The water resources system configuration remains the same as in 2015 (7 dams479
in disuse because of the Syrian civil war; Table 1).480
2. Re-operate dams. Starting in 2018, Syrians independently rebuild and re-operate dams481
that fell into disuse to their prior capacities.482
3. Higher irrigation efficiency. Donor organizations promote and support Syrian farmers to483
rebuild and redevelop their irrigation systems to increase efficiency by 10%, reaching 60%484
and 80% from surface water and groundwater sources respectively from 2018 onwards.485
In the status quo scenario, inflow to the Wahda dam would slightly increase with a higher486
irrigation efficiency in Syria (Fig. 9). According to our simulations, Jordan and Syria would487
respectively receive 2.4 and 5.6 hm3/year more water than with the status quo of damaged Syrian488
dams remaining in disuse. This increase may indicate a potential benefit for Jordan to help Syrian489
farmers upgrade their irrigation networks so long as saved water flows to the Wahda dam. As for490
the scenario that considers the rehabilitation of the Syrian dams destroyed or damaged during the491
civil war, Jordan can expect the Yarmouk River flow to significantly decrease and return to the492
2010 low flow state.493
CONCLUSIONS494
Amulti-agent simulation model of the entire Yarmouk River basin water system (infrastructure,495
water supply and demand, reservoir capacities and operating rules, irrigation policies, institutional496
interactions) has been built from remote sensing products and two time-series of monthly flows497
near the outlet of the basin only. This modeling effort was undertaken while most of the basin is in498
the midst of a civil war since 2011, and for which no detailed ground data has ever been available.499
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The model has been validated over the historical period 1983-2015 ( ′ = 0.64 and 0.90 for its500
two gauging stations).501
We have used the model to assess the contributions of natural and anthropogenic factors in the502
collapse of the Yarmouk flows. Our results indicate (8) the unilateral construction of dams that are503
not listed in the 1987 agreement between Syria and Jordan (Jordanian narrative) seems to have had504
a limited impact on the flow regime changes; (88) a 36% precipitation decrease since the first half505
of the 20th century (Syrian narrative) has partly led to the river flow decline; and (888) groundwater506
over-abstraction by Syrian highland farmers (theory hardly mentioned) can explain most of the507
decrease in Yarmouk flows.508
Our sensitivity analysis on three hydrological parameters (crop water requirements, infiltration509
and natural flow estimates) reveals that if we had considered higher irrigation water withdrawals510
and lower infiltration, the Yarmouk River flow would have collapsed no matter which scenario is511
considered. In that case, the main cause of the flow decline would probably be the general growth512
of agricultural demand close to the Syrian reservoirs.513
There are two limitations to our work that stem from difficulty to access reliable data in a514
complex and ever-changing region. First, we interpolated and extrapolated land uses over a 30-515
year period from three land use maps generated for 1984, 1998, and 2014. Second, there is little516
information on aquifer dynamics. In the case of the reduced groundwater pumping scenario we517
assumed that the base flow would increase if groundwater average recharges exceeded its average518
losses over a 24-month period that characterizes a certain transit time inside the aquifer.519
Two reasons may explain why groundwater overextraction has not been publicly discussed520
by the riparians: groundwater extraction is not mentioned in the Jordanian–Syrian agreement521
(groundwater regulation is unfortunately largely ignored in international water law; Eckstein and522
Eckstein 2005); and until now, there has not been a tractable method to quantify the effects of523
groundwater extraction on stream flow, particularly a method that works using extremely limited524
ground data and that could be applied in a war-torn region.525
By modeling institutional interactions as per the 1994 Treaty of Peace between Jordan and526
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Israel, we have assessed the relative contributions of these natural and anthropogenic factors on the527
sharing of the Yarmouk waters between the two countries. This has also been useful when testing528
future scenarios to estimate how Jordan and Israel can support the post-war recovery of Syria while529
promoting their own hydrological interests.530
The approach developed in this paper is based on freely available remote sensing data and531
modeling tools (for land use, dams characterization method, precipitation, hydrological modeling532
and systems modeling). The tools and results can be used in basins where riparian countries and533
stakeholders share information or they do not. Outside parties can also use the tools and results534
with less reliance on basin parties for critical information. The methodology has the potential to535
target issues hampering an effective cooperation between parties, and to provide decision-support536
information in cases requiring further negotiations.537
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TABLE 1. Dams considered in the modeling.
Name Operator’s Listed? Coordinates Completion Disuse Capacity @̄=0Ccountry (East, North)0 year year (hm3) (hm3/year)
Al-Manzarah Israel Yes 223485, 282845 1982 - 2.3 0.3Avnei Eitan al-Golan - 223991, 246480 1982 - 2.3 0.5
Abidin
Syria
Yes 228895, 242487 1989 - 5.5 0.4
Qunaitera No 231404, 280519 2006 2013 33.9 9.3
Jisr al-Raqqad Yes 234093, 253358 1991 - 11.0 1.4
Kudnah Yes 236056, 270196 1992 - 30.0 5.4
Al-Ghar Yes 235663, 249285 1990 2013 5.5 0.5
Saham al-Jawlan Yes 236335, 245880 1995 - 20.0 0.6
Ghadir al-Bustan Yes 237999, 260863 1987 - 12.0 1.9
Tasil Yes 240680, 253980 1984 - 6.6 7.7
Adwan Yes 245080, 243840 1986 2013 5.7 3.0
Ebtaa kabeer Yes 254499, 247077 1972 2013 3.5 8.9
Sheick Miskin Yes 255463, 252644 1982 2013 15.0 30.1
Roum Yes 305526, 237106 1977 - 6.4 0.3
Sahwat al-Khadr Yes 277060, 218989 1986 - 8.8 0.6
Dar’a al-Sharqi Yes 254714, 223397 1970 2013 15.0 31.1
Tafas Yes 247434, 240864 1982 - 2.1 6.9
Al-Ghariyah al-Sharqiyah Yes 271627, 231346 1982 2013 5.0 11.7
Harran Yes 304324, 223335 1980 - 2.0 0.3
El Wahda Jordan Yes 232104, 237922 2007 - 110.0 64.4
0Coordinates are expressed in WGS 84/UTM zone 36N (EPSG:32636).
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TABLE 2. Consequences of each scenario on the transfers as per the 1994 Treaty of Peace between
Israel and Jordan 1994.
Beneficiary’s share Historical No precip. decline List. dams only No GW pump. dev. Aggregate effects
Jordan Avg. flow (hm
3/year) 116.7 133.5 117.9 145.1 150.2
Diff.0 (%) - +14.5 +1.0 +24.4 +28.7
Israel Avg. flow (hm
3/year) 39.1 53.9 39.7 55.7 67.5
Diff. (%) - +37.9 +1.5 +42.7 +72.9
Jordan Avg. flow (hm3/year) 16.9 48.5 17.2 25.8 64.0
River Diff. (%) - +187.0 +1.9 +52.6 +278.7
0Difference with the simulated historical flow.
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Fig. 1. The Yarmouk River basin as part of the Jordan River basin, with reservoirs other thanWahda
detected using remote sensing – colors refer to the inclusion in the bilateral agreement between
Syria and Jordan (1987); see Fig. 3. All coordinates are expressed in the Coordinate Reference
System WGS 84/UTM zone 36N (EPSG:32636), in which 1 unit equals 1 m.
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Fig. 2. Yarmouk River flow – expressed in terms of base flow (moving minimum over a 12
months period) and runoff (remaining flow) – measured at the station of the Wahda dam by the
Jordanian Ministry of Water and Irrigation and the Jordan Valley Authority; and PERSIANN-CDR
precipitation upstream from that station.
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Fig. 3. Reservoirs, usages, wadis and canals detected in the Yarmouk River basin using remote
sensing, and Yarmoukeem Pool (YP)–Lake Tiberias–KAC water exchange systems.














        Riparian country
        Operator (reservoir, diversion)
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Rules and regulations:
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        Groundwater extraction rules
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Water fluxes:
        Water sharing as per the 1994 Treaty of Peace
        Un-allocated water and return flows
        Surface water transfer
Fig. 4. Multi-agent representation of the Yarmouk River basin water resources system.
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Listed (Syria & Israel)
Obs. storage (Syria & Israel)
Fig. 5. Cumulative storage capacity and variations in Syria and the Israel-occupied Golan Heights.
Capacities are sorted in terms of their inclusion in the agreement between Syria and Jordan 1987.
Color codes for capacity categories are the same as in Fig. 1 and Fig. 3.
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Fig. 6. Measured flows and simulation results of the historical flow at Wahda (top) and Adasiya
(bottom) stations.
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Fig. 7. Simulated flow at the Wahda dam location for the proposed scenarios (top), and water year
flow difference with the historical run (bottom).
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Fig. 8. Sensitivity analysis of the remote sensing-based MAS model to three hydrological param-
eters (crop water requirements CWR, infiltration, natural flow estimate). “-” refers to the standard
value considered in the section Scenarios over the Historical Period. The threshold of 7 hm3/month
for the 25th percentile of monthly flows indicates the base flow measured at the Wahda dam station
by MWI/JVA before the collapse of the Yarmouk River flow in 1999.
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Fig. 9. Simulated flows at the Wahda dam location for future scenarios averaged over the period
2018-2025.
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